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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
QUESTIONS - THE NECESSITY OF EXPLICIT AUTHORIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICERS To TAKE ACTIONS WHICH LIMIT FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS -
Appellant applied for renewal of his radio operator's license but refused to 
complete an FCC form relating to past and present affiliations with the 
Communist Party and other organizations which advocate the violent over-
throw of the United States Government. At that time, and later in a hearing 
granted by the FCC, appellant relied upon the first amendment to justify his 
refusal. Subsequently the FCC denied his application. On appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, affirmed, one judge 
dissenting. Pursuant to its power to grant licenses in the public interest,1 
the FCC may impose a loyalty oath as a qualification for a license. Such 
qualification does not abridge appellant's rights under the first amendment. 
Borrow v. FCC, 29 U.S.L. Week 2011 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1960), cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 892 (1960). 
Although the Supreme Court has at times elevated the first amendment 
to a "preferred position,"2 it has recognized that freedom of speech is not 
absolute. The Court has formulated various tests to apply to statutes which 
appear to infringe on freedom of expression.3 When, in the Court's view, 
a statute infringes "indirectly" on the freedom of expression, the Court has 
tested its validity through a judicial balancing of an individual's right to 
free speech4 against the public need for order and security.5 The question 
of the constitutional validity of the imposition of a loyalty oath or exam-
ination is subject to the balancing test.6 The Court has explained that 
loyalty tests may be valid in cases concerning "a limited class of persons in 
or aspiring to public positions by which they could, if evilly motivated, 
1 Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 
(1958): "Except as otherwise provided in this act, the Commission from time to time, as 
public convenience, interest, or necessity require, shall ••• (l) Have authority to prescribe 
the qualifications of station operators, to classify them according to the duties to be per-
formed, to fix the forms of such licenses, and to issue them to such citizens of the United 
States as the Commission finds qualified .••• " 
2 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). See also Kauper, The First Ten Amendments, 37 A.B.A.J. 
717 (1951). But see Justice Frankfurter's criticism in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 
(1949) (concurring opinion). 
3 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925). See also Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger-Its Origin and Ap-
plication, 13 U. DET. L.J. 198 (1950); Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: 
Scope of Its Applicability, 48 MrcH. L. REv. Sll (1950). 
4 This formulation of the interests to be balanced has been criticized because it fails 
to take into account the interest that society has in the individual's freedom of expression. 
See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (dissenting opinion). 
5 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Barenblatt v. United 
States, mpra note 4. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
6 See Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951): Garner v. Board of Public 
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Lerner v. 
Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960). 
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create serious danger to the public safety."7 There is a notable paucity 
among recent cases in the loyalty-security area of cases in which the Court 
has struck the balance in favor of the individual.8 Indeed, those cases in 
this area in which the Court has struck down government regulation of 
freedom of expression have been placed on narrow grounds.o 
Perhaps a balancing of interests in the principal case would necessitate 
denial of appellant's license. It would seem, however, that the dissenting 
judge's reliance on the rule of Greene v. McElroy10 is well placed. In the 
Greene case the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to pass upon what it 
conceived to be a serious constitutional issue because the procedure followed 
by administrative officers in "areas of doubtful constitutionality" must be 
explicitly authorized by either the Congress or the President.11 There was 
no such authorization in that case. In the principal case the extent of the 
discretion granted the FCC appears to be questionable. The statute is 
framed in broad terms, and there is no mention of loyalty-security meas-
ures.12 As a matter of fact, some members of Congress have doubted the 
FCC's power to undertake loyalty examinations, and legislation has been 
sponsored on the theory that this power is lacking.13 Although the proposed 
legislation has failed to pass, the FCC now claims these disputed powers.14 
The case seems an appropriate one for the application of an approach 
similar to that of the Greene case. 
The Supreme Court has not yet applied the authorization test to a case 
involving first amendment questions,111 but it has not hesitated to strike 
7 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958). See generally cases cited in note 6 supra. 
8 Among the early cases striking a balance for the individual are De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353 (1937), and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). In the more recent cases 
the concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957), endorsed 
by the majority in Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 4, found the state interest 
insufficient. 
o Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (loyalty oath made no provision for lack 
of scienter); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (invocation of fifth 
amendment in relation to associations and belief did not support summary dismissal); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (invocation of the first and fourteenth 
amendments did not furnish "sufficient evidence" to support determination of lack of good 
moral character and loyalty); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (running of 
statute of limitations, inaccurate instructions, and insufficient evidence); Speiser v. Randall, 
supra note 6 (loyalty oath required for tax exemption placed burden of proof on claimant). 
10 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Kent v. Dulles, 
357 U.S. 116 (1958). Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
11 Petitioner lost his employment because of the revocation of his security clearance. 
The Court observed that, while security measures were authorized, the specific procedures 
involving non-confrontation of accusing witnesses were not involved. Greene v. McElroy, 
supra note 10, at 506-08. 
12 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U .S.C. § 303 (1958), quoted in note I supra. 
Note that in the Greene case, some security measures were authorized. 
13 See H.R. 3364, H.R. 10446, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. 5074, H.R. REP. No. 814, 
S. REP. No. 882, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), and debate in 87 CONG. REc. 6258-60, 9508-09, 
9627-29 (1941). 
14 See also Travis Lafferty, 23 F.C.C. 761 (1957). 
111 In Graham v. Richmond, 272 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the court, citing the Greene 
case, held that legislation and executive orders concerning security measures in the Merchant 
640 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
down limitations on free expression which, although capable of being en-
acted, were for some reason technically invalid.10 It would seem that the 
Greene "rule" should be applied whenever express authorization is totally 
lacking. A court's prejudgment of the constitutional issue should not fore-
close an inquiry into the primary question of clear authorization.l 7 The 
policy of the Supreme Court to avoid constitutional issues is well estab-
Iished,ts and this policy is particularly marked in the loyalty-security area.to 
Although this policy of avoidance has been decried by many,20 the approach 
of the Greene case may be seen as a valuable one. It serves as notice to the 
Congress and the President that loyalty-security measures will require their 
personal and explicit authorization in cases in which fundamental freedoms 
are concerned. It also serves as an admonition to administrative heads not 
to act without clear authorization in such cases. In light of the confusion 
resulting from some of the Court's previous decisions in this field,21 these 
ends are indeed desirable. 
Walter R. Allan 
Marine did not clearly authorize the automatic rejection of an individual who refused, on 
the basis of first amendment rights, to answer questions relating to Communist affiliations. 
16 Compare Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 9, with Nelson v. County 
of Los Angeles, supra note 6; Wieman v. Updegraff, supra note 9, with Garner v. Board of 
Public Works, supra note 6. 
17 It is settled, of course, that an administrative agency cannot act out of the bounds 
of its granted powers. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 3ll U.S. 7 (1940). 
18 E.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
10 See cases cited in note 9 supra. 
20 See Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court: 
Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1951); Rauh, Non-Confrontation 
in Security Cases: the Greene Decision, 45 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1959). 
21 See Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck. to Dennis, 52 CoLu111. L 
REv. 812 (1952); Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NOTRE DAME LAw. 
325 (1952). 
